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DEBATING EMPLOYEE NON-COMPETES
AND TRADE SECRETS
Sharon K. Sandeen† and Elizabeth A. Rowe††
Recently, a cacophony of concerns have been raised about
the propriety of noncompetition agreements (NCAs) entered into
between employers and employees, fueled by media reports of
agreements which attempt to restrain low-wage and low-skilled
workers, such as sandwich makers and dog walkers. In the lead-up to
the passage of the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA),
public policy arguments in favor of employee mobility were strongly
advocated by those representing the “California view” on the
enforceability of NCAs, leading to a special provision of the DTSA
that limits injunctive relief with respect to employee NCAs. Through
our lens as trade secret scholars, we enter the fray and present this
Article to explore both the values and detriments of NCAs, each
taking sides in the debate and providing relevant information about
the different approaches to the enforceability of these agreements.
Finally, we come together to suggest a more nuanced middle-ground
to encourage courts to engage in a more robust analysis that focuses
on both the legitimate business interest to be protected by the NCA
and reasonableness in the scope of the agreement. To that end, we
recommend consideration of six questions to help guide courts in
achieving a more equitable and balanced outcome to protect the
interests of employers and employees.
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INTRODUCTION
When businesses wish to restrict others (often employees) from
working for competitors, they enter into written restrictive covenants
known as noncompetition agreements or noncompetes (NCAs).
Recently, a cacophony of concerns has been raised about the
propriety of NCAs entered into between employers and employees,
fueled by media reports of agreements which attempt to restrain lowwage and low-skilled workers, such as sandwich makers and dog
1
walkers. In the lead-up to the passage of the federal Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA), public policy arguments in favor of
employee mobility were strongly advocated by those representing the
2
“California view” on the enforceability of NCAs, leading to a special
provision of the DTSA which limits injunctive relief with respect to
3
employee NCAs. Most recently, the Obama administration had made
it a priority to highlight and advocate for greater limitations on the
4
enforcement of NCAs in the employment setting.
Through our lens as trade secret scholars, we have decided to
enter the fray and present this article as a discussion of what we
perceive are the values and detriments of NCAs, with the ultimate
goal of suggesting a better way for courts (and perhaps, legislators) to
determine the enforceability of such agreements. Currently, states
generally follow two diametrically opposed approaches to the
question of the enforceability of NCAs: (1) the California view
(followed by a handful of other states) which holds that such
agreements are unenforceable, with few exceptions; and (2) the
majority view, which holds that such agreements are enforceable
unless unreasonable. In between these two poles falls a highly fact1. See, e.g., Ruth Simon, Litigation Over Noncompete Clauses Is Rising, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 14, 2014), http://bit.do/NoncompeteLitigationRising; Sarah Whitten, Jimmy John’s drops
noncompete
clauses
following
settlement,
CNBC
(June
22,
2016),
http://bit.do/JimmyJohnsDropsNoncompete; Dave Jamieson, Doggy Day Care Chain Makes Pet
Sitters Sign Noncompetes To Protect ‘Trade Secrets’, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 24, 2014),
http://bit.do/PetSitterNoncompete.
2. A California law dating from 1872, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (1941), makes
non-compete agreements void and unenforceable except in very limited circumstances involving
the sale of a business.
3. See letter by Professor Sharon K. Sandeen to Senator Dianne Feinstein (dated Aug.
28, 2014) (on file with authors); see also ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE (2013).
4. See White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: The Obama
Administration Announces New Steps to Spur Competition In The Labor Market And Accelerate
Wage Growth (Oct. 25, 2016); White House Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order –
Steps To Increase Competition And Better Inform Consumers And Workers To Support
Continued Growth Of The American Economy (Apr. 15, 2016); White House Office of the Press
Secretary, State Call to Action On Non-compete Agreements (Oct. 25, 2016).
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specific analysis that often results in unpredictable and seemingly
inconsistent rulings.
While the native Californian among us, Professor Sandeen,
favors the California view because it provides a bright-line and
predictable test that focuses attention on the purpose of the restraint,
she agrees with Professor Rowe that the analysis under the majority
view ought to be improved. Fortunately, as outlined in this article, the
common law of restraints of trade, coupled with the definition of
trade secrets under both the Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) and
the DTSA, provide the basis for a more improved analysis.
In Part II, we provide an overview of the current law governing
NCAs, including a discussion of its common law development and
the traditional “legitimate business interest” and “reasonable scope”
requirements of enforceable NCAs. Part III provides a description of
recent legislative reform efforts. Then, in Parts IV and V, we each
take a side in the debate, providing relevant information about the
different views on the enforceability question.
In discussing the California view in Part IV, Professor Sandeen
emphasizes the need to keep the question of the enforceability of
employee NCAs separate from the question of the enforceability of
nondisclosure and nonsolicitation agreements. Properly tailored
nondisclosure and nonsolicitation agreements that do not restrict an
individual from pursuing a trade or profession are acceptable,
provided they are otherwise reasonable. She then provides some
rationales for why states, like California, might prefer a bright-line
test of unenforceability for NCAs.
In Part V, Professor Rowe presents the other side of the debate,
setting forth several reasons why appropriately tailored NCAs are
beneficial. She argues that employee NCAs can be a valuable and
complementary tool for protecting trade secrets because they can be
the most effective remedy in some circumstances of trade secret
misappropriation. Thus, she advocates for a more nuanced and robust
approach to the enforceability of NCAs that is different from the
usual binary choice of keeping or banning them. She maintains that to
the extent there are concerns about some aspects of NCAs, there are
existing mechanisms to protect the interests of employees, and more
targeted approaches to addressing specific problems with noncompetes might be a more fruitful focus for both employers and
employees, rather than the impulsive motivation to ban NCAs
altogether.
For those states that follow the majority view, in Part VI, we join
forces to suggest an analytical framework that courts faced with the
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enforceability question could use to ensure that NCAs are not used for
anti-competitive or abusive purposes. The article concludes in Part
VII.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW GOVERNING NON-COMPETES
The use of NCAs has a long history, dating back over 500 years,
and debates about the pros and cons of such restraints have persisted
5
throughout that time. The battle lines are typically drawn between
those who advocate for freedom of contract and emphasize that the
restrictions are limited to the contracting parties, and those who see
the broader societal implications of restrictions placed on trade and
employee mobility. Due to concerns about restraints of trade, the
general rule is that NCAs are unenforceable, but as the common law
developed, it was recognized that they might be acceptable if
ancillary to a legitimate purpose and “reasonable.” The public policy
underlying such a rule was succinctly expressed by then-Judge
Howard Taft in U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.:
The objections to such restraints were mainly two. One was that by such
contracts a man disabled himself from earning a livelihood with the risk of
becoming a public charge, and deprived the community of the benefit of
his labor. The other was that such restraints tended to give the covenantee,
the beneficiary of such restraints, a monopoly of the trade, from which he
had thus excluded one competitor, and by the same mean might exclude
others.6

He also noted the “mischief” and “great abuses” that might arise
“from corporations perpetually laboring for exclusive advantages in
trade.”7
The Restatement (First) of Contracts (first published in 1932)
details the predominate U.S. law governing restraints of trade in
sections 512-519. The general rule is that “[a] bargain in restraint of
8
trade is illegal if the restraint is unreasonable.” Based upon this, most
states will enforce NCAs if they are shown to be reasonable, differing
only on such matters as what constitutes reasonableness, the degree
and type of evidence that is needed, and who has the burden of proof

5. See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625,
626 (1960).
6. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d as
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
7. Id.
8. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 513 (1932) RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 513-14 (1932) (“A bargain in restraint of trade is illegal if the restraint is
unreasonable.”).
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9

on the issue on reasonableness. Currently, only four states expressly
prohibit the enforcement of such agreements, except in narrow
10
circumstances: California, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Oklahoma.
A. The Many Forms of Restraint on Trade
Restraints of trade can take many forms, and as the cases reveal,
it is important to distinguish between restraints that prevent an
individual from pursuing a trade or profession (NCAs) from those
that proscribe certain discrete behaviors, such as the disclosure or use
of confidential information or the solicitation of clients. The focus of
this article is on “true” NCAs and not nondisclosure agreements or
nonsolicitation agreements that are mislabeled as NCAs (although
many cases involve multiple types of restraints that need to be sorted
out). In states like California, where NCAs are unenforceable except
in very limited circumstances, reasonable and properly tailored
nondisclosure and nonsolicitation agreements will often be
enforced.11 The same goes for states where reasonable NCAs are
enforceable, with the analysis of reasonableness focusing, in part, on
the purpose for the restraint. As a general rule, the more an individual
is prevented from pursuing his or her trade or professional calling, the
more suspect the agreement.
It is also important to distinguish between restraints that are
ancillary to an underlying contract and those that are not.12 Pursuant
to U.S. antitrust law, all “unreasonable” restraints of trade are
prohibited by the Sherman Act (or analogous state laws) and may be
subject to an enforcement actions by the U.S. Department of Justice
or the Federal Trade Commission,13 but restraints that are ancillary to
a contract entered into for another purpose will generally be analyzed
under the “rule of reason”14 and often are not challenged on antitrust
grounds. In contrast, so-called “direct restraints” are more likely to be
9. BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY,
(10th ed., with 2016 supplement); Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer:
Relative Enforcement of Covenant Not to Compete Agreements, Trends, and Implications for
Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 757 (2011).
10. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (2016); LSA-R.S. 23:921 (2015); N.D.C.C. § 9-0806 (2016); Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 217 (2016). Other states have statutes governing non-compete
agreements, but they are not as narrowly drawn. See e.g., C.R.S.A. § 8-2-113 (1982) (Colorado).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 187-88 (1981).
13. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
14. Perceptron, Inc. v. Sensor Adaptive Machines, Inc., 221 F.3d 913, 919 (6th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Lektro–Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265 (7th Cir.1981)) (“The parties
agree that the legality of noncompetition covenants ancillary to a legitimate transaction must be
analyzed under the rule of reason.”).
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subject to scrutiny under state or federal antitrust laws.15 Judge Taft
discussed the distinction as follows:
No conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant
embodying it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract,
and necessary to protect the covenantee in the full enjoyment of the
legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an
unjust use of those fruits by the other party.16

Typically, where NCAs of the ancillary type are allowed, they
arise in two distinct situations: (1) in conjunction with an arms-length
business transaction, often concerning the sale of a business or an
intellectual property license; or (2) as part of an employment
relationship.17
As recounted by Professor Harlan Blake in his seminal article on
the history of NCAs, early case law followed a unitary approach to
the enforceability of NCAs that did not differentiate between NCAs
that were entered into in conjunction with a business relationship and
those that were ancillary to an employment relationship.18 But as
business and employment practices began to change in the late 1800s,
there was greater recognition of the need to distinguish the two
circumstances due to the social benefits of employee mobility and
because the purposes of the two types of restraints are fundamentally
different. As Professor Blake explained:
[The] objective [of postemployment restraint] is not to prevent the
competitive use of the unique personal qualities of the employee–either
during or after the employment–but to prevent competitive use, for a time,
of information or relationships which pertain peculiarly to the employer
and which the employee acquired in the course of the employment. Unlike
a restraint accompanying a sale of good will, an employee restraint is not
necessary for the employer to get the full value of the thing being
acquired–in this case, the employee's current services.

Thus, a key to the reasonableness of an employee restraint is that
it is not for the purpose of preventing competition, but rather, is
designed to prevent an employee from using “peculiar” information
or relationships learned from a former employer in competition with
the former employer. Also, while the particular formulations of the
test of reasonableness differ from state to state, with some being more
15. See Blake, supra note 5 (noting that the history of restraints on trade “may cast some
light on the continuing debate between proponents of ‘per se’ doctrines and those advocating
extension of the ‘rule of reason’”).
16. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 271.
17. See, e.g., Sherman v. Pffeferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, 474-75 (1922) (describing the two
types of cases and noting the need for different analyses). See also Blake, supra note 5, at 646;
Restatement (First) of Contracts § 515(e) (1932).
18. See Blake, supra note 5.
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detailed than others are, the enforceability of NCAs generally requires
that the restraint be no greater than is required for the protection of
the employer, not impose undue hardship on the employee, and not be
injurious to the public.19 Under antitrust law, the injury requires a
balancing of the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the
restraint,20 which, in the case of NCAs, makes the purpose and scope
of the restraint key considerations that should not be ignored. As the
foregoing quote by Judge Taft indicates, the restraint must be
supported by a legitimate business purpose.
B. The Legitimate Business Interest Requirement
At common law, the requirement that restraints of trade be
ancillary to a lawful contract required that the restraints be
“reasonably necessary” to protect a “legitimate business interest”21 In
U.S. v. Addyston Pipe, Judge Taft listed five previously recognized
ancillary purposes, including agreements with an “assistant, servant,
or agent” to protect “from the danger of loss to the employer's
business caused by the unjust use on the part of the employee of the
confidential knowledge acquired in such business.”22
Although principles of trade secret law began to emerge in the
United States in 1837,23 many of the early cases involved trade secrets
related to a business being sold or to specific trade secrets being sold
or licensed, and not to trade secrets shared in the context of an
employment relationship.24 As NCAs became more prevalent in the
employment context, and a legitimate business interest to justify such
restrictions had to be found, the protection of confidential information
and customer relationships emerged as the predominate justification.25

19. Id. at 648-49; see also Restatement (First) of Contracts § 515 (1932); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 187 (1981).
20. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (“Under this rule,
the fact finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.”).
21. Both Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 281, and the California case of Wright v.
Ryder, 36 Cal. 342 (1868), provide detailed accounts of the common law development of
restraints of trade through the end of the 1800s. The Restatement (First) of Contracts, sets forth
the same law as further developed and refined through 1932.
22. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 281.
23. Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837).
24. See, e.g., Welch, 26 Mass. at 523; Wilder v. Adams, 29 F. Cas. 1216 (C.C.D. Mass.
1846); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) (an early case involving the employment
relationship).
25. See e.g., Pffeferkorn, 241 Mass. at 474-75; Chandler, Gardner & Williams, Inc. v.
Reynolds, 250 Mass. 309 (1924); Boston & Suburban Laundry Co., Inc. v. O’Reilly, 253 Mass,
94 (1925).
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In fact, such a justification was included in the commentary to the
Restatement (First) of Contracts, published in 1932, which provides:
A promise of a former employee will not ordinarily be enforced so as to
preclude him from exercising skill and knowledge acquired in his
employer's business, even if the competition is injurious to the latter,
except so far as to prevent the use of trade secrets or lists of customers, or
unless the services of the employee are of a unique character.26

The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is in accord, noting the
difficulty of justifying employee restraints without a “legitimate
interest in restraining the employee from appropriating valuable trade
information and customer relationships.”27
There are various stated reasons for recognizing the protection of
confidential information as a legitimate business interest to support
employee restraints. First, such a rule is consistent with the law of
trade secrecy that holds, in many situations, that employees are under
an implied obligation to maintain their employer’s trade secrets.28
Second, and related to the first, is a sort of “but-for” test that is
applied when the circumstances indicate that the employee could not
have obtained the subject information except in the context of his
employment with the plaintiff/employer.29 An overriding justification
for the rule is the perceived equities of the circumstances, particularly
since the remedy that is ordinarily sought is injunctive relief.30 As
summarized by Professor Blake: “What most . . . cases require . . . is
that the employer show special circumstances which make it unfair
for him to bear all the risk of placing the employee in a position in
which a later breach of confidence might be costly.”31 This generally
requires a business interest that enjoys “some degree of legal
protection even in the absence of a contract.”32
As the circumstances surrounding employee restraints move
away from cases of clear access to trade secret information to other
26. Restatement (First) of Contracts § 516(f) (1932).
27. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981).
28. See e.g., Pffeferkorn, 241 Mass. at 474-75 (citing Anchor Electric v. Hawkes, 171
Mass. 101 (1898), among other cases).
29. O’Reilly, 253 Mass at 94; Molina v. Barany, 56 N.Y.S. 2d 214 (1945).
30. When the cause of action to enforce an NCA is based upon contract law, the remedy
sought is typically specific performance of the restraint. When the underlying cause of action is
a trade secret misappropriation claim, the remedy sought is an injunction. Because both
remedies are equitable remedies, courts will consider the equities of the situation before
deciding to grant the requested relief. See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Chapter
16 Remedies, Topic 3, Enforcement by Specific Performance of Injunction (1981, updated
2016).
31. Blake, supra note 5, at 651.
32. Id. at 653.
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types of employer-owned confidential information (or none at all), the
“legitimate business interest” analysis becomes more complicated.
The inquiry generally examines: (1) the nature of the underlying
information and whether it is already publicly known, including
whether the information constitutes the general skill and knowledge
of the employee;33 and (2) whether the information was subject to
efforts to keep it confidential.34 But the mere existence of
“protectable” information is not the end of the inquiry. “A restraint is
reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for the
protection of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on
the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.”35
In recent years, courts that have considered the enforceability of
NCAs in the context of employment agreements often fail to explore
the issue of legitimate business interest in-depth, instead skipping
ahead to the second part of the reasonableness analysis to determine if
the restrictions on future employment are reasonable in scope.36
While greater empirical research is needed on this point, it seems that
contemporary courts either look for “ancillary agreements” without
exploring the actual purpose of those agreements or are more willing
to accept an employer’s bald assertions of the need to protect
confidential information than was the case before 1960,37 even though
the requirements for trade secret protection have become more
exacting since the adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)
in 1979.38 But while ignoring this critical issue is problematic from
both a legal and policy perspective, it also provides a means to
improve the NCA enforceability analysis through the simple
expedient of requiring courts to find a “legitimate” business interest
before engaging in the reasonableness analysis.

33. Id. at 672.
34. Id. at 673-74.
35. Id. at 648-49 (noting that these categories are adapted from the Restatement’s
formulation.).
36. See, e.g., Bodemer v. Swanel Beverage, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 2d 717 (N.D. Ind. 2012).
Compare Wrigg v. Junkermier, Clark, Campanella, Stevens, P.C., 362 Mont. 496, 500 (2011)
(noting that the legitimate business requirement “acknowledges the long standing principle that
a covenant that serves no legitimate business interest necessarily is oppressive and invalid.”).
37. See Blake, supra note 5, at 649-50 (“[H]aving completed the analysis of the extent of
a protectable interest, courts usually find the relevant considerations exhausted; the other
branches of the Restatement formulation are seldom, as separate considerations, given much
attention.”).
38. Among other changes, the UTSA made the definition of a trade secret more exacting
and specifically precluded other tort claims involving “competitively significant information.”
See UTSA § 1 and § 4 (1985).
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C. The Requirement of Reasonableness
Determining that a restraint is “ancillary to the main purpose of a
lawful contract” and that there is a “legitimate business interest” to
support the restraint is only part of the required analysis concerning
the enforceability of NCAs. The next step is to determine if the scope
of the restraint is “reasonable,” i.e., no more than necessary to further
the employer’s legitimate business interest. In Arthur Murray Dance
Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, one court set forth forty-one questions
that could be asked concerning the reasonableness of employee
restraints.39 More narrowly, the scope of restraint analysis typically
examines: (1) the nature of the business and related field-of-use
restrictions; (2) the duration of the restriction; (3) the geographic
reach of the restriction; and (4) in the case of NCAs to protect trade
40
secrets, how quickly the trade secret may diminish. Courts will also
consider the financial hardship to the employee if the noncompetition
41
agreement is enforced and the public interest.
NCAs, like any contract in the United States, require
consideration in exchange for the promise. In the employment
context, if signed at the beginning of the employment relationship, the
employment itself provides the required consideration in many
42
jurisdictions.
If signed after employment begins, continued
employment might be sufficient if it was understood from the
beginning that such an agreement would be a condition of the job.
Continued employment is enough consideration in about thirty-five
43
states. However, the length of the continued employment that is
deemed sufficient can vary. For instance, in Tennessee, Illinois, and
the District of Columbia, if the employment was for an “appreciably
long” time or of “sufficient duration” then it will be deemed sufficient
44
consideration. Idaho has an interesting variation that ties the
consideration of additional consideration to the length of the NCA.45
Under Idaho law, an NCA that does not provide additional

39. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E. 2d 685 (Ohio Com.
Pl. 1952).
40. See SHARON K. SANDEEN & ELIZABETH A. ROWE, TRADE SECRET LAW IN A
NUTSHELL (2013).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 211.
43. Id.
44. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF PRESS SECRETARY, NON-COMPETE REFORM: A
POLICYMAKER’S GUIDE TO STATE POLICIES (2016), http://bit.do/NoncompeteReform [hereinafter
Non-Compete Reform].
45. IOWA CODE ANN. § 550.2 (WEST 2016)
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consideration cannot exceed eighteen months.46 In about thirteen
states, the mere continuation of at-will employment is not enough
consideration for a noncompetition agreement signed during the term
of the employment.47 Thus, the employer must provide fresh
consideration, such as a salary increase.
II.

RECENT EFFORTS TO REFORM THE LAW GOVERNING
NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS

There has recently been a wave of attempts by those who wish to
ban NCAs to modify the laws in states that enforce them. The
Alliance for Open Competition (AOC), among other organizations
and individuals, has lobbied nationwide as part of these efforts.48 The
group’s objective is to “break down a major barrier to
entrepreneurialism; the use of non-competition agreements mandated
by employers that force employees to sign away their rights to engage
in any business of a competitive nature when they leave their present
jobs.”49
A. State Efforts
Legislators in states like Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Oregon, and Washington, have considered legislation
restricting NCAs. Recent efforts failed in Massachusetts,50
52
Michigan,51 and Washington, but Oregon passed legislation in
201553 and Hawaii54 and Illinois55 passed legislation in 2016. More
legislation is expected to be introduced in 2017.
In general, the efforts to reform NCAs have focused on several
respectable objectives. These include, for instance, creating greater
transparency for employees regarding the terms of noncompetition
agreements, eradicating enforcement of noncompetition agreements
against low-wage workers, implementing exemptions for certain
occupations, and restricting the geographic scope and duration of
46. Id.
47. ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, § 6.01[3][F][I] (2016) (discussing
whether at-will employment is consideration for a restrictive covenant).
48. Alliance for Open Competition, About Us, OPEN COMPETITION (2017),
http://bit.do/AllianceOpenCompetition. See also the advocacy efforts of various labor unions.
49. Id.
50. See H.B 4323 (Mass. 2016).
51. See H.B. 4198 (Mich. 2015).
52. See H.B. 1926, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
53. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2016).
54. See 2015 Haw. Sess. Laws 158.
55. See 2016 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 99-860 (S.B. 3163) (West).
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56

noncompetition clauses. Several state legislatures have considered
changes to their noncompetition regimes. Some, like Georgia, have
57
actually moved toward greater enforcement.
Alabama further
58
clarified what is a valid protectable interest for such agreements.
Some states have limited or prohibited noncompetition
agreements for certain occupations: New Mexico restricts
59
enforceability for some healthcare practitioners,
and Hawaii
60
prohibits them for technology workers. There were proposals in
New Jersey and Maryland to make NCAs unenforceable for those
61
workers who may be eligible for unemployment compensation.
Recent reform efforts in some states have also attempted to
legislatively limit the duration of postemployment restrictions. For
instance, Oregon has restricted noncompetition agreements to a
62
63
maximum of eighteen months, and Washington to one year.
B. Federal Efforts and the DTSA
On the federal level, proposals during the 114th Congress (20152016), titled the Mobility and Opportunity for Vulnerable Employees
64
65
Act (MOVE) and the LADDER Act, were introduced but not
passed. This legislation was motivated by the fear that
noncompetition agreements are now being used to restrict not only
higher earning executives and top-level employees, but minimum66
67
wage workers at fast food restaurants and even dog sitters.
The DTSA, while not expressly endorsing any particular state’s
approach, contains a provision that was intended to honor the
noncompetition laws of each state. However, the provision, in effect,
takes a strong position against the enforcement of NCAs. Section
1836 (b)(3)(A)(i), provides that a court may grant an injunction
provided that it does not:
56. See Non-Compete Reform, supra note 44, at 2.
57. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-53 (2012).
58. ALA. CODE § 8-1-190 (2016).
59. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1I-2 (2015).
60. HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-4(d). A similar bill was also proposed in Missouri but did not
pass. H.R. 1660, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016).
61. See N.J. Assemb. 3970, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2013); S. 468, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Md. 2013).
62. Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.295(2) (2016).
63. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (LEXISNEXIS 2016).
64. ME Act, S. 1504, 114th Cong. (2015).
65. LADDER Act, H.R. 2873, 114th Cong. (2015).
66. See Press Release, Congressman Joseph Crowley, Jimmy John’s Takes a Bite Out of
Workers’ Rights (Oct. 22, 2014), http://bit.do/JimmyJohnsWorkersRights.
67. See Jamieson, supra note 1, at 2.
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(I) prevent a person from entering into an employment relationship, and
that conditions placed on such employment shall be based on evidence of
threatened misappropriation, and not merely on the information the person
knows; or (II) otherwise conflict with an applicable State law prohibiting
restraints on the practice of a lawful profession, trade, or business.68

This language could be read to prevent a court from granting an
injunction restraining an employee from working for another
employer in any state, even in states that enforce noncompetition
agreements, at least with respect to the remedies that are available for
trade secret misappropriation under the DTSA.69 It follows then that
employers in states that enforce NCAs will need to rely on state
contract and trade secret law to restrain employees from working for
competitors. For those in states like California, applying the DTSA
will largely mirror the existing state law on noncompetition
agreements and the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
With respect to the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the DTSA
does not adopt the doctrine, instead seemingly preventing application
of the doctrine in states that recognize it. The language of section
1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I), supra, provides that an injunction must be based
on evidence of threatened misappropriation, and not merely on the
fact that an individual knows certain information. However, the
clause preceding that language, which bans injunctions restraining
employment, seems to eviscerate the heart of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine (which usually prevents an employee from working for a
competitor for a certain period). Accordingly, the DTSA strikes a
blow to states that recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine by
making that doctrine inapplicable in DTSA actions.
III. THE BENEFITS OF CALIFORNIA’S APPROACH
The California approach to the enforceability of NCAs dates
back to the late 1800s when the California Legislature was one of the
first states to adopt a comprehensive set of civil codes and reflects a
clear choice that the California legislature made in 1872 to opt for a
default rule of unenforceability. The legislation (now codified in
Business & Professions Code section 16600, hereafter “16600”)
followed an 1868 case in which the California Supreme Court, after
carefully detailing the common law on restraints of trade, decided not
to enforce an NCA that would have prevented the buyer of a
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(I)-(II) (West 2016).
69. A review of the legislative history raises a question about whether this was what was
intended by Congress. This provision was heavily influenced and lobbied for by those
representing the California view on inevitable disclosure and employee mobility. Sen. Feinstein
(of California), in particular, was a key advocate and supporter of this approach.
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steamboat from operating in the waters of California. Although the
seller urged the court to respect the freedom to contract, the court
ruled that the public’s interest in free competition overrode such
principle, in part due to the court’s concern that it would be difficult
to discern where a contract was a limited restraint and where it was
71
not.
A. California’s Approach Focuses Attention on Whether a
Legitimate Business Interest Exists
As a result of California’s early rejection of NCAs, the state
never really developed a body of law that recognized the protection of
trade secrets as a legitimate business interest to justify employee
NCAs and, in fact, never developed the so-called “trade secret
exception” to 16600. Rather, the need for a legitimate business
interest is built into the types of restraints of trade it will enforce;
namely, nondisclosure agreements and nonsolicitation agreements.
The California approach, while rejecting NCAs except in connection
with the sale of a business, looks closely at the real purpose of the
restrictions. Regardless of the title that is placed on a contract or
clause, the critical issue in California is whether the agreement
restricts an individual in their trade or profession. If it does, it will not
be enforced, but if the agreement merely precludes the use or
disclosure of confidential information or the solicitation of former
clients, then it is not an NCA and will be enforced if otherwise
reasonable. This was the result in Gordon v. Landau, the case often
cited as creating the so-called trade secret exception but which, in
reality, simply recognized that nondisclosure agreements designed to
72
protect trade secrets can be enforceable in California.
Seen in the foregoing light, California law is not that far
removed from the common law approach. In states that properly
apply the common law approach instead of the California approach,
employee NCAs are only enforced if an interest in protecting
legitimate trade secrets and confidential information is shown. In
70. Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 342 (1868).
71. Id. at 361 (“But we have grave doubts whether, in this age of abundant capital and
active competition in all the avenues of commerce, the withdrawal of a single boat from our
navigable waters could be deemed an appreciable restraint upon trade, or result in the slightest
inconvenience to the public. The difficulty lies in fixing the line between that which is or is not
an appreciable restraint of trade.”).
72. Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 694 (1958) (“It clearly appears from the terms of
the contract that it did not prevent defendant from carrying on a weekly credit business or any
other business. He merely agreed not to use plaintiffs’ confidential lists to solicit customers for
himself for a period of one year following termination of his employment. Such an agreement is
valid and enforceable.”); see also Ret. Grp. v. Galante, 176 Cal. App. 4th 1226 (2009).
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California, an NCA will not be enforced, but nondisclosure
agreements to protect legitimate trade secrets and confidential
information will be. In both cases, however, the restrictions must be
tailored to the interest sought to be protected and be reasonable in
scope. By making most NCAs unenforceable, California decided that
restrictions on employees that extend beyond a promise not to use or
disclose confidential information are unreasonable
B. California’s Approach Does Not Unduly Burden Employees
The tendency of contemporary courts and litigants to pay scant
attention to the legitimate business interest prong of the NCA
enforceability analysis is one reason why states may wish to adopt the
California approach and render most NCAs void ab initio. But there
are other reasons and, at bottom, the choice (particularly in the
employment context) comes down to who should bear the burden of
negotiating and litigating a reasonable NCA. More to the point, to
what extent can states trust employers within their state to only draft
and seek to enforce “reasonable” NCAs? If most employers cannot be
trusted to draft reasonable NCAs that are designed to protect
legitimate business interests, then the likely costs to a state are undue
restrictions on employee mobility, reduced competition, and more
litigation. Under California’s approach, the burden of drafting an
appropriately tailored agreement that is focused on a legitimate
business interest is placed upon employers.
California’s approach also reduces litigation to enforce NCAs,
either because lawsuits are not brought in the first place or because it
provides a relatively quick means for employees who are sued to
prevail on a Motion for Summary Judgment.73 Additionally, by
stating that most NCAs are unenforceable, there are less means by
which threats of lawsuits can be used to chill legitimate behavior—
including competition—by former employees. This is because,
although threats may still be made (particularly if the employee also
signed a nondisclosure agreement), it is fairly easy for employees in
California (and their attorneys) to learn that the NCA they signed
cannot be enforced. Moreover, illegal NCAs in California may be the
basis of a claim for unfair business practices74 and terminating an
73. See, e.g., Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 564, 570 (2009) (trial
court granted motion for summary judgment on the ground that restrictive covenant was void ab
initio).
74. Dowell v. Biosense Webster, Inc., 179 Cal. App. 4th 564, 575 (2009) (“An
employer’s use of an illegal non-compete agreement also violates the UCL § 17200 [“unfair
competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising”].).”
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employee for violating or refusing to sign an unenforceable NCA may
constitute wrongful termination.75
C. California’s Approach Is More Efficient, Clear, and
Predictable
Three related benefits of California’s approach are its efficiency,
clarity, and predictability. As noted previously, forty-six states and
76
the District of Columbia recognize and enforce reasonable NCAs.
Of these, twenty-six have statutes governing their enforcement, while
77
the remainder rely largely on common law. As a practical matter,
this means that the particular laws and policies of each state must be
researched to determine if an NCA will be enforced, a process that
most employees cannot afford to pursue. Employers are also
adversely affected by inconsistent and unclear laws governing NCAs,
increasing their transaction costs as they try to craft agreements that
will be enforced in multiple states. Adding to the inefficiency is the
fact that the reasonableness analysis is very fact-driven and, at the
time an NCA is entered into, can only be determined based upon
representations that are often unverifiable. The inability to verify the
existence of trade secrets and other confidential information before an
NCA is entered into is of particular concern.
Given the nature of trade secrets—namely, the fact that they are
supposed to remain at least “relatively secret”—there are practical
problems associated with an employee trying to determine if a
legitimate business interest to protect trade secrets actually exists. For
one, anything more than a general description of trade secrets in an
NCA would create another document that might lead to the disclosure
and loss of those trade secrets. Second, trade secrets are not “granted”
like patent rights and there is no place to “register” them like
trademarks and copyrights, meaning that there is no independent and
preexisting body of information that an employee can search to verify
the existence of alleged trade secrets. Third, although employees are
often required to sign NCAs or nondisclosure agreements, employers
do not always adequately identify or mark the information that they
claim to be trade secret or confidential information.
In light of the strong policy against restraints of trade, there is
something unsettling about enforcing NCAs when the putative trade
secret owner does not have to specifically identify and prove the
75. Silguero v. Creteguard, Inc., 187 Cal. App. 4th 60, 63, as modified on denial of reh’g
(Aug. 16, 2010).
76. Infra Part II.
77. Id.
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existence of trade secrets and confidential information at the time the
agreement is entered into. If the mere assertion of trade secret rights is
the only thing that is needed to justify restraints on trade, there is a
great risk of the over-assertion of such rights, or what Judge Taft
referred to as “corporations perpetually laboring for exclusive
advantages in trade.”78 What company wouldn’t assert the existence
of trade secrets if it provides a ready basis upon which to restrict
competition? Thus, if we really care about free competition, the
legitimacy of the business interest should depend upon something
more than the alleged existence of trade secrets. Or, as California has
decided, NCAs in such circumstances can be banned altogether.
Lastly, the California view has important ancillary effects that lie
at the heart of the policy choice. First, it promotes competition,
including the ability of former employees to create competitive
businesses that, in theory, have the salutary effect of lowering costs to
consumers. Second, the policy can lead to greater innovation,
creativity, and efficiency, as the competitive businesses founded by
former employees attempt to differentiate themselves from their
competition, including former employers. Third, California’s view
promotes employee mobility, including personal growth and potential
upward mobility. It also encourages the workforce to be productive,
rather than spending a year or more on “garden leave” or in jobs that
do not fully utilize an employee’s talents.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF THE MAJORITY VIEW
While some scholars have argued for the adoption of the
California view and against the enforcement of NCAs for many of the
79
reasons detailed above, and that noncompetition agreements are
superfluous in light of the availability of trade secret protection,80
there is another story that can be told about the use of NCAs to
protect trade secrets. Here, Professor Rowe details what she considers
are the benefits of employee NCAs that are designed to protect trade
secrets. She asserts that when trade secrets are genuinely at risk,
NCAs provide an additional level of protection that is often better
suited to the circumstances than nondisclosure agreements (NDAs).
78. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 279.
79. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 118-19 (2013); Viva R. Moffat,
Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 939, 965-84 (2012); Viva R. Moffat,
The Wrong Tool for the Wrong Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 873, 873 (2010).
80. See Maura Irene Strassberg, An Ethical Rabbit Hole: Model Rule
4.4, Intentional Interference with Former Employee Non-Disclosure Agreements and the Threat
of Disqualification, Part II, 89 NEB. L. REV. 923 (2011).
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To the extent there are concerns about some aspects of NCAs, she
argues that there are existing mechanisms to protect the interests of
employees, and more targeted approaches to addressing specific
problems with non-competes might be a more fruitful focus for both
employers and employees rather than the impulsive motivation to ban
NCAs altogether.
A. NCAs Supplement Trade Secret Protection
As detailed above, the protection of trade secrets has long been
81
considered a legitimate business interest that can justify an NCA.
However, not only are trade secrets a legitimate protectable interest of
an employer, but information that does not reach the level of a trade
secret and is merely “confidential” to the employer has also been
deemed sufficient to support reasonable restraints against an
employee.82 Indeed, perhaps it is the notion of commercial privacy or
protection against commercial piracy that is really at the heart of the
83
legitimate business interest requirement. Because employers have a
broad range of proprietary interests worth protecting from employee
piracy, NCAs are needed to supplement the law of trade secrecy
which does not protect all confidential and proprietary information.
The rising importance of business information also suggests that it is
not only employees who are exposed to technical trade secrets who
might need to enter into noncompetition agreements. Just as it is
standard advice that employers should enter into appropriate
nondisclosure agreements with their employees in order to protect
their trade secrets, it would be unwise to suggest that they only do so
with employees exposed to technical information.
Both the UTSA and DTSA permit the granting of injunctions for
84
threatened misappropriation of trade secrets and, therefore, one
remedy available to courts is to enjoin an employee from working for
85
a competitor. However, this option is also quite controversial.
Courts, in general, are reluctant to grant such a drastic remedy for the
same reasons that contractual restraints of trade are suspect. The
presence of a contractual agreement between the employer and the
81. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489 (D.N.J. 1999);
Diodato v. Wells Fargo, 44 F. Supp. 3d 541, 568 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
82. See, e.g., Campbell Soup, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 489; Proudfoot Consulting Co. v. Gordon,
576 F.3d 223, 1233-36 (11th Cir. 2009).
83. See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 NE. 2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976)
(noting that an employer has a legitimate interest “in safeguarding that which his business made
successful and to protect himself against deliberate surreptitious commercial piracy”).
84. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 2 (1985).
85. See NON-COMPETE CONTRACTS, supra note 22, at 4.
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employee, i.e., an NCA, often is the difference in a court deciding
whether to impose this injunctive remedy to restrain an employee.
Moreover, a properly worded and tailored NCA helps the court and
the parties to identify the information at issue and can serve as a
check on employer tendencies to claim more trade secrets postemployment than were identified during the employment.
Even without an NCA, some courts apply the inevitable
disclosure doctrine to prevent an employee from working for a new
employer.86 It is a highly controversial remedy precisely because
critics complain that there is no contractual agreement between the
employer and employee. If NCAs designed to protect trade secrets are
also disallowed, the reasoning becomes circular: trade secret law, by
itself, cannot replace NCAs because when it does, it falls prey to the
same arguments about fairness and employee mobility that are used to
attack NCAs. Under the DTSA, the argument is even more tenuous
because it explicitly does not permit injunctions that would restrain an
87
employee from working for a competitor. It is, therefore, not an
88
option—not even in states that permit NCAs. Accordingly, federal
civil protection for trade secret misappropriation does not supply a
substitute or a remedy that achieves the same objectives as an NCA.
Rather, an employer would need to file an action for breach of
contract or under the state trade secret misappropriation statute, rather
89
than under the DTSA, if it wishes to restrain an employee. Of
course, the breach of contract action would only provide for such a
remedy if the trade secret owner was suing to enforce a contractual
agreement like an NCA.90
B. Employers Have Incentives to Draft Reasonable NCAs
Careful attention to the drafting stage of the NCAs might be a
very fruitful focus for both employers’ and employees’ interests.
Given the importance of trade secrets to companies, when faced with
the legitimate threat of misappropriation from a soon to be former
employee, it is certainly in the employer’s best interest to have
drafted an agreement that the court will deem reasonable and
therefore enforceable. Employers, therefore, have every incentive to
86. See Merck & Co. v. Lyon, 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Barilla America, Inc.
v. Wright, No. 4-02-CV-90267, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12773 (S.D. Iowa July 5, 2002).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(I) (West 2014).
88. Id.
89. See infra Part II.B.
90. Although the UTSA precludes all tort claims related to “competitively significant
information” other that trade secret claims, it specifically does not preclude breach of contract
claims. See U.T.S.A. § 7 (amended 1985).
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draft NCAs that will be enforced by the courts, in the event that it
becomes necessary to file an action against a former employee.
Arguably, if an NCA looks like an agreement that one might
have arrived at after careful deliberation and negotiation between the
employer and an employee who is represented by counsel, rather than
91
an overbroad contract of adhesion, it is more likely to be enforced.
This is why, for instance, those cases where employers agree to pay
the salary of the employee while he or she sits out for a certain period
of time before joining the new employer are an easier call for courts.
These “garden leave” type agreements, though not as widely accepted
92
in the United States as they are in Europe, go a long way to
addressing the interests of both sides: compensation to the employee
for the restriction on his mobility for a limited time, and assurances to
the employer that its trade secrets will be protected during its most
vulnerable period. Nonetheless, a focus on the scope and nature of the
information to be protected is also necessary.
When the focus of an NCA shifts away from the protection of
“all information” and toward the protection of legitimate and
identified trade secrets and confidential information, it is more likely
to be enforced, but as importantly, it is more likely to be understood
and honored by employees. When this shift in focus occurs, then only
those employees who in fact have access to such secrets and who are
exposed to sensitive information should be entering into NCAs. If
employers also adopt the recommended trade secret protection
strategy of “need to know” rather than “good to know,” they will
naturally limit the number of NCAs that are required.
C. The Difficulty and Costs of Enforcing NCAs Serve as a
Check on Abuses
Largely missing from the debates about the enforceability of
NCAs in the trade secret context is the recognition that courts already
have a wide range of options to enforce trade secret rights, including
tailoring specific injunctions to prevent misappropriation when an
employee accepts work with a competitor that risks disclosure of the
former employer’s trade secrets. Thus, whether deciding to issue an
injunction pursuant to a UTSA or DTSA claim or to specifically
enforce a restriction in an NCA, courts are acting “in equity” and are
91. See Spann v. Lovett & Co., Ltd., 2012 Ark. App. 107, 389 S.W.3d 77, 90 (2012)
(holding that a contract not to compete was reasonable, one of the factors being the contract was
negotiated).
92. See generally, Charles A. Sullivan, Tending the Garden: Restricting Competition via
“Garden Leave”, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 293, 299-305 (2016).
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required to balance the rights of the employer with the rights of the
employee and the public. Before limiting an employee’s mobility
there must be a strong business justification. This does not necessarily
present a binary choice of working for the competitor or not. Rather,
there is a middle ground, wherein some courts will permit the
employee to accept his or her new assignment, but provide for
separation or reassignment of certain tasks and duties for a certain
period of time in order to avoid even the temptation to disclose the
former employer’s trade secrets. While it could be argued that this
weighs in favor of banning NCAs because the injunctive mechanisms
93
within trade secret law already provide a satisfactory remedy,
arguably injunctions related to enforceable NCAs can be more readily
tailored to the circumstances as defined in the NCA itself.
In most jurisdictions, courts will reform an NCA that is
94
determined to be unreasonable. Some courts adopt this “blue
95
pencil” approach and will partially enforce the agreement, while
96
others void the entire agreement if one provision is unreasonable.
However, courts may not add terms to a contract under the “blue
pencil” approach. In states that follow an equitable reform or
reformation doctrine, judges can amend any questionable language in
order to create an enforceable contract that matches the original intent
of the parties. This is more flexible than the blue pencil doctrine, but
some worry that it may encourage employers to include riskier
provisions in their agreements. This can then affect the behavior of
employees who rely on language that is unlikely to be enforced. Some
states, however, in “red pencil” jurisdictions, do not allow any
modification of contracts and instead courts in these jurisdictions will
render the entire contract unenforceable, if any provision is found to
be unenforceable.
Courts therefore have the flexibility to consider a whole host of
information beyond the specific terms of the agreement in deciding
whether it would be equitable to restrain the employee. One
93. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
94. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1) (West 2015); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN.
§445.774a (West 2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. ANN. § 15.51(c) (West 2015).
95. See Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463,1469
(1st Cir. 1992) (The term “blue penciling” refers to the process of amending contract terms as
opposed to refusing to enforce them. Professional editors (before word processing) often used
blue pencils to indicate changes and red pencils to indicate deletions. With respect to NCAs, the
term “blue penciling” refers to processes whereby NCAs may be re-written by courts instead of
being held unenforceable. The term “red penciling” means that a court is unwilling to rewrite an
unreasonable term contained in an NCA.).
96. See WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (West 2015) (specifying that unreasonable restraints are
unenforceable even though other parts of the contract might be reasonable).
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consideration, for instance, could be the occupational field of work in
which the agreement is being used. Employees in occupations like
engineering and computer science are more likely to sign
97
noncompetition agreements. This is not particularly surprising or
troubling given that these types of employees tend to be involved in
research and development, and thus privy to sensitive trade secret
information. Nevertheless, while the field of work or one’s position
alone should not be determinative, these can be important
considerations for a court in deciding how to carve out appropriate
relief.
In addition to the courts’ flexibility in enforcing NCAs, the
practical reality is that there are many reasons why NCAs are unlikely
to be enforced by employers in the first place. Professor
Gomulkiewicz, in an excellent article, discussed evidence of the
“leakiness” of noncompetition agreements in the state of Washington.
He found that between 2005 and 2014, there were only thirty-two
cases against former employees to enforce noncompetition
98
agreements in Washington courts. He identifies several reasons that
might explain this phenomenon, including, the costs of litigation, the
risks of counter litigation, the risks of disclosing trade secrets during
99
litigation, and potential negative public relations for the employer.
He suggests that employers may choose to file actions against the
departing employees to enforce noncompetition agreements only in
100
the most egregious cases.
There is no reason to believe that a
similar pattern does not exist in all or most states that enforce NCAs
and that such a lack of enforcement could serve to mute the overall
effect of having employees sign noncompetition agreements.
Moreover, about half of the states that allow noncompetition
agreements already provide exemptions for certain professions.
Interestingly, the professions most often exempted are broadcasters
101
and medical practitioners.
Seven states exempt broadcasters from
their noncompetition laws, including Arizona, Connecticut, District of
102
Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maine, and Washington. Part of
the concern is that broadcasters working in, for instance, rural areas
97. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, NONCOMPETE CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2016),
http://bit.do/DeptofTreasNonCompeteContracts.
98. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-To-Compete as the Legal
Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 251, 277-88 (2015).
99. See id. at 280-86.
100. See id. at 288.
101. Non-Compete Reform, supra note 44, at 6.
102. Id.
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may have very limited options for employment. Another seven states
103
have exemptions for physicians and medical practitioners.
These
include Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
104
Tennessee, and Texas.
It is believed that noncompetition
agreements interfere with patients access to medical providers as well
105
as patient’s rights to choose their providers.
D. Legislation Can Address Specific Concerns While Not
Banning NCAs
Even if noncompetition agreements are often not enforced across
the country, there is still concern about possible chilling effects on
employees who have these restrictive agreements in their contracts
and are unaware of the likelihood of enforcement. More targeted
approaches to addressing these specific concerns rather than painting
NCAs with a broad brush might prove more fruitful.
Sometimes, employers present to employees noncompetition
agreements that contain unenforceable or overbroad provisions.
Because workers are not usually aware of the unenforceability of such
provisions, such terms can have a chilling effect on their behavior,
particularly if employers are known to threaten litigation. However,
banning noncompetition agreements in a particular state does not
necessarily protect employees in that state from having to sign such
agreements. For instance, even though California does not enforce
NCAs, one study found that 62% of CEO contracts for companies
106
headquartered in California contained noncompetition clauses.
This means that the chilling effect on mobility, assuming the pattern
bears out for noncompetition agreements in general, would not be
erased. Accordingly, some attention might be given to efforts to
discourage employer’s from including unenforceable terms in their
agreements.
Steps to encourage transparency of NCAs might go a long way
in this effort. Ideally, for those employees who are well-informed and
consult with counsel, steps can be taken to reduce the likelihood of
litigation or to negotiate favorable terms in the beginning of the
employment process that would leave out or mute the effect of a very
restrictive noncompetition agreement. In some cases, employees also
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 7.
106. See Norman Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin, and Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical
Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2015).
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negotiate with their new employers to receive what is effectively the
cost of defense and indemnification if the former employer decides to
file an action to enforce the noncompetition agreement. If, however, it
is the rare employee who is in a position to bargain or negotiate the
107
terms of his or her noncompetition agreement,
then the argument
for external control through legislation makes more sense. This is
especially so in circumstances where employers introduce
noncompetition agreements after an employee has already started
work.
It can also be troubling when employees’ noncompetition
agreements, come in the “cubewrap” or “click to agree” variety. In
one case, a court upheld an agreement where the employee clicked
108
the “accept” button on a pop-up notification. Perhaps these are the
kinds of cases that move legislators to act on a grand scale, but it is
not advisable to overreact or attempt to over-correct what may
otherwise be a workable framework. Legislation that is specifically
tailored to target certain kinds of conduct to protect particular
segments of workers deemed most vulnerable might be one approach.
Another approach might be to require an express written agreement,
and exclude “clickwrap” agreements as an appropriate format for an
NCA. The problem could also be left to the courts, wherein the nature
of such contracts or the conditions under which they were extracted
might be deemed unreasonable (rather than limiting reasonableness to
109
the usual focus on length, geography, and breadth).
To the extent those most likely to be harmed by NCAs are lowlevel workers (who also tend to be low-wage workers) who do not
have adequate means and access to counsel, possible reform measures
tying wage levels to enforcement of noncompetition agreements
might make sense. As of April 2017, it is expected that some states
will have moved toward establishing these kinds of limits. For
instance, in Oregon, a statute adopted effective January 1, 2016,
requires that an employee’s salary exceed the median family income
for a family of four in order for a noncompetition agreement to be
110
enforceable.
An Illinois statute prohibits noncompetition
107. See Orly Lobel, Enforceability TBD: From Status to Contract in Intellectual Property
Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 869, 877 (2016).
108. See Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Storm, 2014 WL 1266827, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27,
2014).
109. The reasonableness test often considers whether an employer has a legally protected
interest, and whether the noncompetition agreement is no wider in scope and duration than is
reasonably necessary to protect that interest. In addition, it cannot impose an undue hardship on
the employee and cannot violate public policy. See e.g., Deutsche Post Glob. Mail, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 116 F. App’x 435, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2004).
110. OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(d) (West 2016).
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agreements with employees earning below thirteen dollars an hour.
Reformers in Massachusetts attempted to set wage levels ($130,000 a
112
year from a Senate
proposal and $47,476 per year from the
113
House
proposal) but were unsuccessful. Although earlier
legislative efforts failed in Washington, new legislation has been
introduced that would void noncompetition agreement if the amount
the employee earns is less than $55,000.114
Another possible reform is to preclude courts from “blue
penciling” NCAs to make them more reasonable, except perhaps on
some limited issues. In states where this practice is allowed, an
incentive is created for employers to overreach because if they do so,
they know that the likely outcome will be the enforceability of rewritten provisions rather than an outright rejection of their NCAs.115
Since the enforceability of NCAs are not litigated with respect to
most employees (except through rare government enforcement
efforts), allowing blue penciling increases the chilling effect of
overbroad NCAs and hampers competition and employee mobility.
Where the concern is about the ability or ease with which private
plaintiffs can (and must) file civil actions to challenge NCAs, one
solution, and one that has already been utilized, is possible criminal
action and investigation through states attorney generals’ offices. For
instance, the New York Attorney General in June 2016 entered into a
settlement with Jimmy John’s, whereby the restaurant chain agreed to
116
stop including noncompetition agreements in its hiring documents.
The practice was determined to be unlawful by the New York
Attorney General’s office. Franchisees of the Jimmy John’s chain in
New York had included noncompetition agreements and contracts
with all employees, preventing them from accepting jobs with
competitors of Jimmy John’s for two years after leaving the company
117
and from working within two miles of a Jimmy John’s store “that
118
made more than 10% of its revenue from sandwiches.”
The
Attorney General deemed this practice “unconscionable” when used
119
to limit the mobility and opportunity for minimum-wage workers.
111. Ill. Comp. Stat. 90/5 (2017).
112. S. 2418, 189th Gen. Ct. (Ma. 2016).
113. H. 4434, 190th Gen. Ct. (Ma. 2016).
114. See S. 5756, 65th Leg. (Wash. 2017).
115. See Kristen Amond, Equalizing the Threat of Noncompete Agreements: Solutions
Beyond Louisiana’s Tangled Web of Nullity, 76 LA. L. REV. 1235 (2016).
116. Whitten, supra note 1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Another notable effort to address the cost of litigation to
employees might be legislation on the award of attorney’s fees in
120
noncompete cases. While some states, such as Florida,
allow a
prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees, some may argue that a
truer balancing considering the perceived uneven balance of power
between employer and employee would be to provide attorney’s fees
only to employees if they prevail, and not employers. This view,
however, is not without limitations, since it may conflict with
attorney’s fees provisions and statutes in some states that would
121
permit either party that prevails to recover attorney’s fees.
V.

PROPOSED JUDICIAL APPROACHES

In this Part, we come together to propose a nuanced middle
ground to encourage courts to engage in a more robust analysis of
NCAs that is in keeping with the common law and principles of
equity. We believe that if courts pay as much attention to ensuring
that a legitimate business interest for a restraint exists as they spend
considering the reasonableness of the restrictions, most NCA abuses
will be eliminated. But there are a number of other specific facts that
courts should consider to determine the reasonableness of NCAs in
the employment context.
We start with the premise that the unique nature of trade
secrets—the fact that they exist only so long as they are not disclosed
or disclosed in confidence—requires that they be protected against
accidental, unauthorized, or other improper disclosure. This interest
must, however, be balanced against public policy in favor of
employee mobility and other public interests. To that end, we join
forces to present an analytical framework, and suggest some guiding
principles that courts faced with the enforceability of NCAs might use
to guard against their use for anti-competitive and/or abusive
purposes.
As noted above, in keeping with common law, the first part of
the inquiry should focus on the legitimate business interest analysis.
This examines the nature of the underlying information and whether it
is already publicly known, including whether the information
constitutes the general skill and knowledge of the employee. Efforts
to maintain the confidentiality of the information should also be
ascertained. The second part of the inquiry, after having determined
120. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(k) (2015).
121. See e.g., CAL. CODE § 1717 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 57.105(7) (2015); WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.84.330 (2015).
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the existence of “protectable information,” should focus on whether
the restraint is no more than necessary to protect the employer’s
interest. As part of this analysis, there should be some showing that
the employee actually had access to the information and actual or
potential threat of use in his new employment. To that end, the
following questions ought to be considered and weighed.
A. Whether There Are Trade Secrets To Be Protected
To the extent the employer asserts that there are trade secrets at
issue, the court can determine if the information is generally known
or readily ascertainable and whether it has economic value. The
employer should also be prepared to demonstrate the critical
component of establishing trade secrecy: that it took reasonable
efforts to protect the secrecy of the information. If the information at
issue is confidential information, but does not rise to the level of a
trade secret, the employer should still demonstrate that it took steps to
protect the confidentiality of the information. NCAs that purport to
protect trade secrets and other confidential information as identified
by the employer should be enforceable under contract law even if the
information does not meet the “independent economic value”
requirements of trade secrecy.
Consistent with common law limitations on the scope of
protectable information, the information to be protected cannot
include the general skill and knowledge that is part of the employee’s
toolkit. Where an employee has worked in an industry for a long time,
it can be difficult to differentiate between an employee’s general
knowledge, and the employer’s trade secret information. As one court
noted:
Mere “knowledge of the intricacies of a [former employer’s] business
operation” does not constitute a protectable secret that would justify
prohibiting the employee from “utilizing his knowledge and talents in this
area. A contrary holding . . . would make those in charge of operations or
specialists in certain aspects of an enterprise virtual hostages of their
employers.”122

Thus, the court must determine whether the employee’s competitive
value to the new employer lies in his knowledge of the former
employer’s trade secrets, or in the employee’s array of general
knowledge and experience gained from education and prior work in
the industry.

122. Int’l Paper Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Reed
Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 594 (N.Y. 1976) (alteration in original)).
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B. Whether the Employee Had Access to the Protected
Information
This inquiry focuses on the extent of the employee’s access to
the protectable information claimed to be protected by the NCA. It
should be analyzed against the backdrop of the reasonable efforts
requirement of trade secrecy and the emerging best practice that trade
secret and confidential information should only be shared on a “need
to know” basis. The greater the amount of access to and the volume
of proprietary information specified, the greater the risk to the
employer that the information might be used inappropriately. Thus,
inquiry into the nature of the employee’s position with the former
employer, the nature of the trade secrets or proprietary information at
stake, and the employee’s role with the new employer would be
highly relevant. The employer may also wish to demonstrate the
likely harm that could result from the employee’s access to, and
potential disclosure of, the proprietary information.
While reformers have attempted to draw lines around wages and
executive-level versus nonexecutive-level employees or various types
123
of occupations,
these limits are not always sufficient. There are
instances, particularly in smaller operations or startups, where a
person’s salary or title does not appropriately reflect their access to
and possession of trade secrets. Accordingly, the aforementioned line
drawing could have gaps and not reach certain types of employees
who should be covered. Focusing an NCA strategy on who is actually
given access to critical information is a practical way of solving the
line drawing problem. It also demonstrates one downside to relying
on legislation rather than the flexibility of the courts, who can rule on
a case-by-case basis.
Consideration should also be given to how the employee
acquired the subject information. It is a long-standing policy of the
United States, codified in the UTSA and the DTSA, that the
acquisition of information through reverse engineering and
independent development (and more generally, through education and
personal growth) is a proper means of acquiring information.
Contractual restrictions that purport to prevent such activities should,
at a minimum, be evaluated as part of the reasonableness analysis, if
not banned outright as a means to balance the interests of employers
and employees.

123.

See infra Part III.A.
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C. Whether There Is Evidence that the Employee Has
Misappropriated or Threatened To Misappropriate the
Employer’s Proprietary Information
The existence of evidence suggesting bad faith or that the
employee has or will disclose or use the information should weigh
heavily in favor of enforcing the restraint. In such circumstances
(particularly if the information at issue is trade secret information),
the NCA is likely to be a complementary remedy to any
accompanying counts for trade secret misappropriation. Both the
UTSA and DTSA provide remedies for actual and threatened
misappropriation of trade secrets. As such, where evidence of such
misappropriation exists, the employer’s protectable interest in the
NCA is further strengthened. The absence of evidence of
misappropriation does not, however, mean that the agreement should
not be enforced, but may dictate the type of remedy to be granted.
Indeed, this is the benefit of a contractual agreement, as long as upon
consideration of the other principles it is deemed reasonable and
enforceable.
D. Whether the NCA, on Its Face, Appears Reasonable in
Terms of Scope and Duration, in Light of the Nature of the
Employee’s Duties and Position with the Company
Scope and duration is typically the current focus of most courts’
124
analysis of NCAs.
Within our framework, however, emphasis is
also placed on the conditions under which the agreement was made.
To the extent the non-competition clause looks like it was arrived at
after careful deliberation and negotiation, rather than an overbroad
contract of adhesion, it should be viewed more favorably to the
employer. This would discourage “click to agree” types of
agreements. In addition, the inclusion of known unenforceable terms
in the agreement should weigh heavily against the employer, as this is
evidence of bad faith and may constitute an act of unfair competition.
It goes without saying that the sandwich-maker at Jimmy John’s
is not the kind of employee who should be signing a two-year
125
noncompetition agreement.
However, a proper inquiry into the
reasonableness of a noncompetition agreement under those
circumstances should lead to the right outcome. There certainly is
room for state legislatures to try to address these kinds of blanket and,
124. See discussion infra note 35.
125. See Clare O’Connor, Does Jimmy John’s Non-Compete Clause For Sandwich Makers
Have Legal Legs?, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://bit.do/JimmyJohnsLegalLegs.
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albeit, unreasonable restraints ex post, but we have to be careful not to
throw out the baby with the bathwater.
E. Whether the Employer Has Provided Payment for the Period
of Time that the Employee Will Be Out of Work
“Garden leave” agreements where the employer agrees to pay
the salary of the employee while he sits out for a certain period of
time before joining the new employer should be encouraged and
looked upon with favor. These agreements address concerns of
fairness and equity to the employee, who is seen as prevented from
earning a living. Whether the payment to sit out is part of the NCA or
proposed by the employer after initiation of litigation should not
make a significant difference, and ought to weigh equally in favor of
the employer. The key is to determine the reasonableness of the
compensation in light of the period of noncompetition, including any
reduction in career advancement during any period of inactivity.
F. Whether the NCA Strikes the Appropriate Balance Between
the Employee’s Freedom to Work and the Employer’s
Protection of Its Protectable Business Interests
Ultimately, evaluation of the above considerations will assist the
court in deciding whether the NCA is enforceable in light of the
particular facts and circumstances of the case. As part of that
determination, the court may consider whether the restraint is the least
restrictive in light of the nature of the information and the threat
posed by the employee’s new employment. In other words, there
should be a direct connection between the type of information to be
protected and the terms of the restraint. In particular, the shelf-life of
the information should be considered because in some situations the
nature of the information could be such that it will no longer be secret
or competitively sensitive at the time the enforcement of an NCA is
requested or after a short period of time.126 In those situations, a court
may lean toward a shorter restrictive period than that provided in the
agreement.
After weighing all of the foregoing considerations and general
principles of equity, and depending on that which is permissible in the
jurisdiction, the court can determine whether the NCA is enforceable.
If so, it can choose from a range of options to craft an order that
reflects the most equitable balance under the circumstances.

126.

See UTSA § 2(a) (which explicitly limits the length of allowable injunctions).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we entered the debate about the propriety of
NCAs through our lens as trade secret scholars. We explored both the
values and detriments of NCAs, each taking sides in the debate and
providing relevant information about the different approaches to the
enforceability of these agreements. Finally, we came together to
suggest a nuanced middle-ground to encourage courts to engage in a
more robust analysis that focuses on both the legitimate business
interest to be protected by the NCA and reasonableness in the scope
of the agreement. To that end, we recommend consideration of six
questions to help guide courts in achieving a more equitable and
balanced outcome to protect the interests of employers and
employees.

